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ARTICLE IX, ARTICLE III, AND THE FIRST 
CONGRESS:  THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1787–1792 
Thomas H. Lee* 
 
This Article describes the original constitutional plan for the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts as set out in Article III of the U.S 
Constitution, debated at the Constitutional Convention and state ratifying 
conventions, implemented by the First Congress, and realized with the first 
case docketed at the Supreme Court, from 1787 to 1792.  In so doing, it relies 
on close readings of three primary sources:  Article IX of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Process Act of 1789.  The 
First Judiciary Act is well known but not often read and analyzed holistically 
as a single, integrated enactment designed to address concerns voiced during 
the state ratification conventions.  Article IX and the First Process Act are 
neither well known nor identified as key sources of Article III of the 
Constitution and its original meaning.  This Article enlarges modern 
conventional wisdoms about the early U.S. federal courts by showing: 
 Their distinctly pro-foreigner orientation as befitting a new weak state, 
in sore need of inbound foreign trade, credit, and investment; 
 The essentiality of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to promote 
international and interstate peace and harmony; 
 The controversial nature of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “both as 
to Law and Fact” when the Constitution was discussed and adopted 
(1787–1788), based on the example of the national appeals court for 
captures under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation;  
 The limited scope of state law rules of decision and procedures within 
the Article III categories of federal judicial power that the First Congress 
actually vested; 
 The relatively limited importance of Article III “arising under” federal 
jurisdiction as an original matter outside of federal crimes and revenue 
laws; and 
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 The overall “nationalist” orientation of the federal courts, to 
subordinate state interests to the overwhelming national survival interest 
in international and interstate peace and commerce. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article illuminates certain nationalist aspects of the original plan for 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in the constitutional 
system of the founding period from 1787 to 1792 that are forgotten or ignored 
today.  By “nationalist,” I mean that the federal courts were originally 
established, in significant part, to reduce tensions with foreign governments 
by subordinating states’ conflicting interests and protecting foreigners and 
providing them favorable forums for resolving maritime and commercial 
disputes with Americans.  The paramount concerns were to ensure that the 
United States stuck together to keep its international law commitments, most 
importantly under the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, and to restore 
and facilitate interstate and international commerce while keeping that 
peace.1  One little known aspect of the mission to mitigate foreign friction 
was a distinct favoritism for foreign litigants and procedures over American 
litigants and state law procedures.  For example, section 11 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,2 the famous “assignee clause” (presently codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1359), prohibited assignment of claims to generate federal jurisdiction but 
did not apply to “cases of foreign bills of exchange,” although it blocked 
assignment of domestic bills of exchange to out-of-state Americans seeking 
to get into federal court.3  Additionally, part of section 9 of the Judiciary Act, 
which is commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), permitted 
friendly and neutral “aliens” to sue for any torts—noncontract injuries to their 
persons or properties—while most out-of-state American tort plaintiffs 
would be blocked by a five-hundred-dollar amount-in-controversy 
requirement.4  Finally, the Process Act of 1789 specified that “forms and 
 
 1. The first proposal for establishing a supreme court and lower federal courts 
contemplated jurisdiction over “all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an 
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may 
be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; . . . and questions which 
may involve the national peace and harmony.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (containing James 
Madison’s notes regarding Edmund Randolph’s Virginia Plan for the Constitution). 
 2. This Article uses “Judiciary Act of 1789,” “First Judiciary Act,” and “Judiciary Act” 
interchangeably. 
 3. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
 4. Id. § 9; see Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 830, 895–900 (2006).  For friendly and neutral aliens, such noncontract 
injuries generally met the statute’s “in violation of the law of nations” requirement because 
contemporaneous international law required a host sovereign state to provide safe conduct to 
the nationals of foreign sovereign states with whom it was at peace. See id. at 879 (quoting 
§ 9, 1 Stat. at 77).  As William Blackstone explained in his Commentaries, “[C]ommitting acts 
of hostility against such as are in amity, league, or truce with us, who are here under a general 
implied safe-conduct; these are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which 
there can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and another.” 4 WILLIAM 
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modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction . . . shall be according to the course of the civil law,” not 
necessarily state law or English law, thereby promising favorable procedural 
law to European litigants who were more learned in the civil law.5 
This Article focuses on three key primary sources to draw out this 
forgotten nationalist, pro-foreigner orientation in the original constitutional 
plan for the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.  The first is Article 
IX of the Articles of Confederation—an antecedent to Article III of the 
Constitution and thus an important source of Article III’s original meaning 
that is largely neglected by constitutional lawyers today.  The second is the 
Judiciary Act of 1789—the framework statute passed by the First Congress, 
which created the federal court system.  Although scholars have extensively 
scrutinized the First Judiciary Act,6 they have not focused on its pro-
foreigner orientation.  Furthermore, there is confusion regarding the 
Judiciary Act’s role as an interpretative aid to resolving ambiguity in Article 
III and its importance as evidence of the original understanding of the 
constitutional scope of federal judicial power where Article III is silent.  By 
explaining the interaction of certain key provisions of the Judiciary Act with 
both Article III and the Bill of Rights, I hope to dispel some of that confusion.  
The third key source in proving the nationalist feature of the original 
understanding of the federal judicial power I have described is the First 
Process Act.  It was enacted on September 29, 1789, five days after the 
Judiciary Act.7  As the first statute that the First Congress passed to prescribe 
forms and modes of proceedings in the newly created federal courts, it was 
the ultimate antecedent of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
statute lasted less than three years (it was implicitly repealed on May 8, 
17928) and has been underexamined.  But, given its vintage, the First Process 
Act is a crucial piece of evidence for divining the original understanding of 
how the national courts were intended to operate and the original meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution. 
This Article’s explication of the original constitutional plan for the federal 
courts expands on prior accounts in at least three significant respects.  As a 
general matter, federal courts scholarship usually begins with how the 
judiciary fits into separation of powers theory and what the courts do and 
should do now, rather than scrutinizing the primary sources and solving the 
puzzle of what they did then.  First, although there is excellent legal academic 
scholarship on the importance of the Supreme Court and the federal courts in 
 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.  Enemy nationals were generally barred from suing in the 
courts of another sovereign state with which their sovereign was at war. 
 5. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94.  Consequently, a Dutch creditor 
could assign a bill of exchange to a New York agent to sue a New York debtor in federal court, 
even though a New York creditor could not sue a New York debtor directly or assign its claim 
to a Connecticut agent. See infra Part I.E. 
 6. See, e.g., ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:  ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. 
 7. See ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93. 
 8. Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792). 
1898 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
the foreign affairs of the early United States,9 there is little discussion of the 
pro-foreigner orientation and the technical aspects of how the judicial branch 
would play this role in the new republic.  Similarly, nonlegal scholarship 
about the centrality of the dire foreign policy picture at the founding to the 
creation of the Constitution does not examine how the design and operation 
of the federal courts under Article III and the First Judiciary Act addressed 
such concerns.10  This Article shows how the fact that the United States was 
militarily weak and fearful of the European powers’ influence, yet desirous 
of peace, credit, and trade with them, led to the establishment of federal 
courts as foreigner-friendly alternatives to state courts for dispute resolution 
in maritime and other cross-border commercial and investment cases.  The 
motive is identical to the turn today toward international commercial 
arbitration and courts by countries seeking to encourage foreign investment 
and trade today.11 
Second, there is a conventional view that the federal courts were originally 
designed to operate like state and English common-law courts, including by 
adhering to state rules of decision and procedures.  Julius Goebel, the 
preeminent historian of the early U.S. courts, famously propounded the 
theory in his opening volume of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History 
of the Supreme Court of the United States.12  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,13 abolishing federal court power to use 
principles of “general law” to decide a tort suit brought by a citizen of one 
state against a citizen of another (only one of nine categories of Article III 
judicial power), is the modern bellwether precedent for the view.  Goebel 
was correct that English common law, mediated by state law, controlled the 
law side of the federal courts’ jurisdiction, but the dockets of the early federal 
courts were crowded with equity (e.g., title fights under conflicting states’ 
land grants), admiralty (e.g., disputes about collisions, salvage, and lost or 
spoiled cargo), and maritime (e.g., contested captures at sea during 
hostilities) causes.  And, with respect to those causes, in the crucial years 
between 1787 and 1792—when Americans drafted, debated, and ratified the 
Constitution, when the First Congress established the federal judicial system 
and the processes federal courts were to apply, and when the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts started hearing cases—the original understanding 
 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE 
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, 
RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY:  WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1–45 (2019). 
 10. See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT:  ORIGINS OF 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); FREDERICK W. 
MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL:  FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1973). 
 11. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 227, 231 
(2020). 
 12. See generally 1 JULIUS GOEBEL JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE (Stanley 
N. Katz ed., 1971); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
(1922). 
 13. 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). 
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and design of the federal judicial branch consciously departed from English 
and state law models.  This Article demonstrates how the Goebel and Erie 
position of state and English common-law dominance as a matter of this 
original constitutional plan is incomplete, despite the fact that state and 
English common-law habits persisted and were plainly ascendant by the end 
of 1792, even in equity, admiralty, and maritime suits.14  That federal judges 
should defer to state law and procedures, generally refrain from “making” 
law under other of Article III’s nine grants of judicial power (e.g., 
ambassadorial or admiralty or maritime jurisdiction), and leave foreign 
policy to the political branches is constitutional dogma today, and they are 
beliefs formed after decades of historical practice and institutional evolution.  
But that dogma is not compelled by the original constitutional plan for the 
federal courts as it was drawn up and implemented from 1787 to 1792. 
Third, another prevalent modern understanding of the Supreme Court, 
underscored by the federal courts scholar Henry Hart, is that its “essential 
role” in our “constitutional plan” is the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, 
particularly of state court decisions.15  Hart’s view requires enlargement in 
two respects, at least with respect to the plan when the Constitution was 
framed and initially implemented.  First, the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction of “all Cases affecting” foreign “Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,”16 such as 
“Controversies between two or more States,”17 was also seen as an essential 
role in the plan, to promote international peace and harmony.  The Court’s 
decision in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison,18 which baptized judicial review, 
was itself a failed original jurisdiction case.  Judicial review—the Supreme 
Court’s power to declare governmental acts unconstitutional—may be 
exercised in the Court’s original jurisdiction as well as its appellate 
jurisdiction.19  The words of Article III of the Constitution explicitly require 
the two original jurisdiction roles because they were seen as “essential” to 
keep peace with the European powers that ambassadors represented, as well 
 
 14. In the modern era, it was the Supreme Court’s decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 
that extended the Erie principle to equity actions in the federal courts. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“To make an exception to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins on the 
equity side of a federal court is to reject the considerations of policy which, after long travail, 
led to that decision.”). 
 15. See Henry M. Hart Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953).  Henry Monaghan 
reminds us that Hart’s famous Dialogue “still remains the mesmerizing starting point for 
anyone interested in congressional control of the Article III courts.” Henry P. Monaghan, 
Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020:  What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 
1, 66–67 (2019).  Hart was also one of the two original authors of the leading casebook-treatise 
on federal courts law, now in its seventh edition. RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (7th ed. 2015). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 17. Id. cl. 1. 
 18. 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 19. James Pfander has previously remarked on the Court’s original jurisdiction as a means 
for enforcing federal rights against states. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 559–61 (1994). 
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as among the states.  Second, when the Constitution was drafted and adopted 
between 1787 and 1788, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “both as to Law 
and Fact” was seen as key to ensuring uniform enforcement of federal laws, 
but it was also extremely controversial because of the potential for retrial of 
state jury verdicts in a distant capital based on the example of the national 
appeals court for captures under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation 
and the absence of any constitutional provisions against reexamination of 
state jury findings.  And when the First Congress decided to create lower 
federal courts with exclusive original jurisdiction as to federal crimes, 
revenue laws, and admiralty and maritime cases (except for common-law 
causes) in 1789, it mitigated this need for uniform enforcement via the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction:  lower federal court exclusive original 
jurisdiction and the Court’s appellate jurisdiction were, to some extent, 
functional substitutes then as they are today.  Modern debates about what 
Article III allows Congress to do with federal jurisdiction and the Supreme 
Court’s essential role must take into the account the Court’s original 
jurisdiction and the significant concerns voiced at the adoption of the 
Constitution regarding its appellate jurisdiction, as well as well-trod 
arguments for its need.20  Relatedly and more generally, the original plan for 
the federal courts envisioned them not only as public law institutions to 
decide questions of constitutional law and to enforce federal laws but also as 
admiralty and commercial courts to promote interstate and international trade 
by supplying credibly neutral dispute resolution services.  Today, the notion 
that federal courts were designed to be active in foreign affairs and to operate 
as “pro-business” commercial courts would be viewed by many as contrary 
to the original constitutional plan, not consistent with it. 
My intent in illuminating the 1787–1792 plan for the federal courts is not 
to suggest that we should resurrect it or seek to apply it again to the present 
in any way:  I am not an originalist in that sense.  My intent, rather, is to draw 
a more accurate and complete picture of how the original adopters of the 
Constitution designed the Supreme Court and federal courts to operate and 
 
 20. Some jurists and scholars have argued that the Constitution requires Congress to vest 
some judicial power over “all Cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the 
United States” (federal question jurisdiction) in federal courts, whether lower court original 
jurisdiction and/or Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 
(1 Wheat.) 304, 339 (1816).  In Martin, Justice Joseph Story distinguished between Article 
III, Section 2’s use of “all Cases” “arising under” federal law, “affecting Ambassadors,” and 
“of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction” and the absence of “all” before listed 
“Controversies,” such as those “to which the United States shall be a Party.” See id. at 333–
37.  Justice Story reasoned that the Framers intended jurisdiction to be mandatory for the three 
enumerated sets of “all Cases,” including arising under cases, whereas for “Controversies” 
lacking the word “all,” Congress could “qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such 
manner as public policy might dictate.” Id. at 334.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990) (reframing 
Justice Story’s argument); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—
Foreword:  Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 44 (1981) (arguing that Congress’s Article III power 
to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is “not an unambiguous license for 
Congress to do as it pleases”). 
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the objectives they sought to accomplish by establishing them.  The Framers 
and ratifiers of the original constitutional plan were not only political 
theorists but also empiricists and nation builders who designed and 
implemented new national institutions (including courts) to fit their practical 
governance imperatives, most pertinently, their geopolitical circumstances as 
a new, weak state.  How that original picture should factor into constitutional 
interpretation today is a different question.  If the Framers and ratifiers were 
to see our world, process our data, and observe our society and its political 
realities, would they have come up with the same solutions?  What does it 
mean to be an originalist in matters of constitutional interpretation anyway?  
Must we stay faithful to the original meanings of written words when they 
became the Constitution?  If so, then the original plan I have sketched may 
be the binding blueprint for what is constitutionally required today.  Such 
questions can and should be debated forever.  But to the extent that arguments 
on one side or the other invoke the original meaning of Article III, the original 
understanding of the federal judicial power in 1787 or 1789, the original 
constitutional plan for the Supreme Court and the federal courts, or some 
such formula of founding-era pedigree, I believe it is necessary to have as 
accurate a sense as possible of what that was.  Hence, this Article. 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I discusses the relevant history 
and key sources.  My treatment will be brief, sketching widely known aspects 
and providing greater detail on uncharted matters.  Part II revises modern 
conventional wisdom about the federal courts based on the account in Part I. 
I.  CONTEXT AND TEXTS IN THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL JUDICIARY 
A.  Articles of Confederation 
Scholarship regarding the Article III courts generally neglects the 
important antecedent of the Articles of Confederation.21  Admittedly, courts 
were a minor feature of the centralized government established by the 
Articles, which is unsurprising since it was a wartime constitution.22  
Ordinary justice delivered by courts is not a priority in war.  Besides, the 
states already had courts of long standing as a legacy of British colonialism.  
But the Articles did provide for proto-national tribunals23 in a manner that 
plainly influenced the plans for the judicial branch discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention that produced Article III of the Constitution.  
 
 21. Goebel is the notable exception:  his account of Article IX of the Articles of 
Confederation is characteristically rich and thorough in description, but he does not elaborate 
on its possible influence on Article III of the Constitution. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 12, at 
143–95.  And despite his immense store of knowledge (or perhaps because of it), his account 
sometimes gets lost in the minutiae and obscures the larger themes. 
 22. The Second Continental Congress deliberated and approved the Articles by November 
17, 1777, and they became fully ratified by all thirteen states on March 1, 1781, upon 
ratification by Maryland. MICHAEL J. GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 
XVIII (2017). 
 23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
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Article IX of the Articles of Confederation addressed courts in four specific 
categories of subject matter. 
1.  Piracies and Felonies Committed on the High Seas 
First, Article IX provided that the “United States, in Congress assembled, 
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing courts for 
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.”24  
“[A]ppointing courts” apparently entailed Congress designating existing 
state courts to try piracies and felonies on the high seas, not establishing new 
courts to try those crimes under the maritime law of nations.  The distinction 
between “appointing” and “establishing” courts in the Articles of 
Confederation yields a clue to interpreting Article III of the Constitution, 
which specifies that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”25  However, when the Continental 
Congress actually passed the ordinance invoking this Article IX power in 
April 1781, it provided for “establishing courts” to try the crimes “as if the 
piracy or felony were committed upon the land,” with juries “according to 
the course of the common law,” and “any two or more” state justices or 
judges “constituted and appointed judges for hearing and trying such 
offenders.”26   
2.  “All Cases” of Maritime Capture 
A second provision—also dealing with maritime jurisdiction—granted the 
United States in Congress the “exclusive right and power” of “establishing 
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; 
provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of 
the said courts.”27  Original jurisdiction was wielded by state admiralty 
courts, which the states had quickly established to condemn prizes given the 
importance of interdicting Great Britain’s sea-lanes once hostilities had 
commenced.  As early as June 1775, Elbridge Gerry urged the Massachusetts 
legislature to fit out armed ships and to establish a prize court to condemn 
captured ships and cargoes.28  Five months later, on November 11, 1775, 
George Washington wrote to John Hancock, president of the Continental 
Congress, pleading for the establishment of a prize court for the Continental 
Navy:  “Should not a court be established by authority of Congress, to take 
cognizance of prizes made by the Continental vessels?  Whatever the mode 
 
 24. Id. para. 1. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 26. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 354–55 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (Apr. 1781). 
 27. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. 
 28. JAMES T. AUSTIN, THE LIFE OF ELBRIDGE GERRY 94 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1828). 
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is . . . there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily determined . . . .”29  
On April 4, 1776, the Continental Congress itself, for the first and only time, 
took original jurisdiction in the matter of a British vessel that had run 
aground, condemning it as a prize and ordering it sold.30  Thereafter, the state 
admiralty courts acted as prize courts, with appeals to Congress as eventually 
codified in Article IX. 
When Congress did come around to establishing a court of appeals for 
maritime captures, “appeals” entailed full-blown trials, not appellate review 
of only legal issues in the modern sense.31  No deference was required to the 
state courts’ findings of fact or law, even when the case had been tried by 
jury, as some states provided for in their admiralty courts, in contrast to the 
practice of adjudication exclusively by admiralty judges in Britain and 
continental Europe.32  All factual and legal findings could be reexamined.  
As James Wilson underscored later at the Constitutional Convention, the 
consensus was that the general court of appeals’ jurisdiction in admiralty and 
maritime cases would mirror the practice in civilian admiralty courts, not the 
jury practice of the common-law courts.33  Indeed, overriding state jury 
verdicts was the main reason for setting up this first federal court for appeals 
from state admiralty courts in the first place, as the Continental Congress 
explained: 
That a controul by appeal is necessary, in order to compel a just and 
uniform execution of the law of nations: 
That the said controul must extend as well over the decisions of juries as 
judges in courts for determining the legality of captures on the sea; 
otherwise the juries would be possessed of the ultimate supreme power of 
executing the law of nations in all cases of captures, and might at any time 
exercise the same in such manner as to prevent a possibility of being 
controuled; a construction which . . . would disable the Congress of the 
United States from giving satisfaction to foreign nations complaining of a 
violation of neutralities, of treaties or other breaches of the law of nations, 
and would enable a jury in any one State to involve the United States in 
hostilities . . . .”34 
The Continental Congress had initially handled prize appeals from the 
state admiralty courts by ad hoc special committees and then through a five-
 
 29. Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (Nov. 11, 1775), in 3 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 213, 213–14 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., New York, G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1889). 
 30. See Today in Naval History:  April 4, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND, 
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/today-in-history/april-4.html 
[https://perma.cc/CFK6-VX66] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (“Continental Navy Frigate 
Columbus captures the British schooner HMS Hawk, making the first American capture of a 
British armed vessel.”). 
 31. See Richard P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority:  The Ordinances of the 
Confederation Congress, 1781–1789, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411, 422 (1997). 
 32. Id.  
 33. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 157. 
 34. 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 26, at 284 (Mar. 
6, 1779). 
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member standing committee.35  It was only by a statute enacted on January 
15, 1780, that Congress finally established a court of appeals for maritime 
captures, as Washington had advised more than four years earlier: 
Resolved, That a court be established for the trial of all appeals from the 
courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture, to consist of 
three judges, appointed and commissioned by Congress, either two of 
whom, in the absence of the other, to hold the said court for the despatch of 
business: 
 . . . . 
That the trials therein be according to the usage of nations and not by 
jury . . . .36 
The implicit substitutability of a congressional committee and a court is an 
important feature of Article IX.  This interchangeable use of Congress and a 
court of appeals in the Articles-of-Confederation period undermines the 
modern view, embraced even by originalists, that founding-era Americans 
drew sharp distinctions between exclusively legislative versus judicial 
powers and institutions.37  The founders were practicing revolutionaries who 
used whatever resources were available to solve urgent real-life problems of 
governance.  They would not necessarily have presumed clean lines between 
the judicial and legislative powers of the general government. 
During the War of Independence, sixty-four cases were submitted to the 
committees of Congress, which decided forty-nine of them and passed eleven 
to the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture for decision.38  Appeals came 
from all of the states, except New York, which was occupied by the British 
from the fall of 1776 until the end of the war, and Georgia, where the 
principal ports of Savannah and Brunswick were also occupied by British 
forces for most of the war.39  The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture is 
widely recognized by scholars as the first “federal court” and the prototype 
for the U.S. Supreme Court.40  By the time the court issued its final decree 
of dismissal in Philadelphia on May 3, 1787, weeks before the Constitutional 
Convention, Goebel reports, “[T]he records indicate that a total of fifty-six 
cases [were] disposed of.”41  What is less well known, but as clear, is that 
 
 35. Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (pt. 2), 27 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 342–43 (1996). 
 36. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 26, at 61 
(second emphasis added). 
 37. See, e.g., William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 
1520 (2020) (asserting that, “[b]ecause Article III vests [the judicial power of the United 
States] in the federal courts, nobody else can have it”). 
 38. J. C. Bancroft Davis, Federal Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131 
U.S. app. xix, xxxiv (1889). 
 39. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 341 n.167.  Both states established admiralty courts 
that do not appear to have heard any cases of maritime capture. See id. 
 40. See generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT:  THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775–1787 (1977).  The court sat 
in Hartford, Philadelphia, New York City, and possibly other cities, with its final May 1787 
sitting in Philadelphia. 
 41. 1 GOEBEL, supra note 12, at 182. 
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Article III’s provision for “appellate Jurisdiction”42 had its antecedent in the 
appellate jurisdiction of this court, which was designed to control state juries 
and ensure compliance with the law of nations. 
3.  Controversies Between Two or More States 
The third type of tribunal that Article IX provided for was authorized to 
decide controversies between two or more states:  “The United States, in 
Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and 
differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more 
States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.”43  
Again, the specification was couched in the language of appellate 
jurisdiction—“the last resort on appeal,”44 although such resort was to 
“Congress” not a court.  In contrast to appeals from prize cases in the state 
admiralty courts, which, as we have seen, were initially entrusted to 
committees of the Continental Congress, Article IX contained an elaborate 
procedure for selecting judges to decide interstate disputes if the state parties 
could not themselves agree on a tribunal, presumably because of their special 
sensitivity.  Five, seven, or nine judges—alternatively referred to as 
“commissioners”—were to be drawn from three names submitted by each 
state in the Confederation.45  Each state party could then, in turn, strike a 
name from the aggregate list until thirteen names remained, from which 
Congress would draw by lot “not less than seven, nor more than nine 
names . . . and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of 
them, shall be commissioners or judges.”46  Even today, the International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution—the international commercial arbitration 
offshoot of the American Arbitration Association—uses a variation of the list 
 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”). 
 43. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Article IX, paragraph 2 provides: 
Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of any State in 
controversy with another, shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in 
question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given, by order of 
Congress, to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, 
and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall 
then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute 
a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, 
Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list 
of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, 
until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than 
seven, nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of 
Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or 
any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine 
the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause, 
shall agree in the determination . . . . 
Id. 
 46. Id. 
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procedure for selecting an arbitral tribunal in cases where private parties 
cannot agree on who will decide their controversy.47 
4.  “All Controversies” Involving Land Claimed Under Grants from Two or 
More States 
Fourth, Article IX addressed the adjudication of “[a]ll controversies 
concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or 
more States.”48  Such controversies were to “be finally determined, as near 
as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes 
respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States”49—that is, by 
“commissioners or judges” selected by the state parties or Congress, as set 
out above. 
*** 
A comparison of these four provisions in Article IX of the Articles of 
Confederation and Article III of the Constitution reinforces a strong sense of 
the influence of Article IX.  All four subject matters made it onto the list of 
cases and controversies to which the federal judicial power extends in Article 
III, Section 2 of the Constitution.50  The constitutional category of 
“Controversies between two or more States” in Article III, Section 2 has been 
committed to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
since the Judiciary Act of 1789 through to today.51  Prize cases and piracies 
and felonies on the high seas—both falling within the category of maritime 
cases—were covered by Article III’s grant of federal judicial power as to “all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”52  Since the First Judiciary 
Act, original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases has been vested 
exclusively in federal courts, subject to the exception of “saving to suitors, 
in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is 
competent to give it.”53  The fourth category—private disputes regarding 
land grants from different states—is plainly the inspiration for the provision 
in Article III of the Constitution extending federal judicial power to 
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States.”54  According to James Madison’s notes, Roger 
Sherman “moved to insert” those words “according to the provisions in the 
 
 47. INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL., INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 
12(6) (2014), https://www.icdr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ICDR_Rules.pdf? 
utm_source=icdr-website&utm_medium=rules-page&utm_campaign=rules-intl 
[https://perma.cc/4VAG-BAG7]. 
 48. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 3. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
 51. This feature of mandatory original jurisdiction over interstate “Controversies” is in 
tension with Justice Story’s and Professor Akhil Amar’s text-based theory that the three 
categories of “all cases” must be vested in federal court and are therefore implicitly more 
important exercises of judicial power than the six categories of “controversies,” which, lacking 
the word “all,” need not be vested in federal court. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 53. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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9th art. of the Confederation—which was agreed to” without objection.55  
One final, striking textual point of resemblance is the use of “all cases” with 
reference to maritime captures and “all controversies” for disputes 
concerning land grants of different states in Article IX.  The words “all 
Cases” marks the first three categories of judicial power in Article III, Section 
2, including admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, while the word 
“Controversies” marks the six subsequent categories of enumerated judicial 
power, including “Controversies between two or more states.”  In sum, the 
evidence strongly suggests that the adopters of the Constitution consulted 
and sometimes copied Article IX of the Articles of Confederation in 
designing Article III.  This continuity of national “judicial” power between 
the Articles of Confederation and Article III of the Constitution is striking 
but often overlooked, even by federal courts experts. 
B.  The Constitutional Convention 
Although debate regarding the judiciary article at the Constitutional 
Convention was relatively limited, it does yield some important clues.  This 
ground is well trod in contrast to discussion of the judiciary provisions of the 
Articles of Confederation, and so I will be brief.  There was consensus at the 
Convention that there should be a national judiciary with a Supreme Court, 
which both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans provided for.56  Disagreement 
focused on how to appoint judges, their terms of office, and whether lower 
federal courts should be created.  Protection against salary diminution and 
life tenure during good behavior were agreed on after some dialog.57  Debate 
about judicial appointment procedures was more contested.  The starting 
point was the Virginia Plan’s proposal for appointment by the legislature, but 
discussion shifted to consideration of the Senate as the appointing body on 
Madison’s urging of a “less numerous & more select body.”58  Madison 
changed his mind, concerned that this would give too much power over 
federal court appointments to the states and instead proposed presidential 
appointment, with or without Senate approval.  The ultimate solution of 
presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate was part 
of an omnibus settlement on appointments.59 
Discussions regarding the creation of federal courts other than the 
Supreme Court were the most heated and protracted debates about the 
 
 55. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 431–32. 
 56. 1 id. at 21–22, 223–24; 3 id. at 600. 
 57. The original proposal for a federal judiciary in the Virginia Plan had prohibited 
increases in salary too:  federal judges were “to receive punctually at stated times fixed 
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to 
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.” 1 id. at 21–22.  
Delegates John Dickinson (Pennsylvania), Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts), and Roger 
Sherman (Connecticut) also proposed removal by the president “on the application [by] the 
Senate and House of Representatives,” for which only Connecticut voted. See 2 id. at 428–29 
(alteration in original). 
 58. See 1 id. at 233 (June 13, 1787). 
 59. Cf. 2 id. at 132, 155, 169, 183 (reporting Convention proposals in which Supreme 
Court Justices would be appointed by the Senate). 
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national judiciary at the Convention.  An initial consensus on establishing 
“one or more inferior tribunals” was challenged by John Rutledge on the 
view “that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide 
in the first instance” because “the right of appeal to the supreme national 
tribunal” was “sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of 
Judgmts.”60  Roger Sherman supported Rutledge based “on the supposed 
expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts 
would answer the same purpose.”61  Madison and James Wilson pushed back 
strenuously.  John Dickinson, supported by Madison and Wilson, suggested 
as a compromise that Congress “be empowered to institute inferior 
tribunals.”62  Pierce Butler resisted the compromise, asserting that “[t]he 
people will not bear such innovations” and that “[t]he States will revolt at 
such encroachments.”63  Dickinson’s motion passed, however, with eight 
votes in favor.64 
Details regarding the Article III specification of judicial powers and 
allocations of original and appellate jurisdiction are harder to come by.  The 
Virginia Plan had originally provided: 
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in 
the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the 
dèrnier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an 
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to 
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the 
National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions 
which may involve the national peace and harmony.65 
In the Committee of the Whole, Randolph moved that the specific categories 
of jurisdiction be left to the Committee of Detail, with only general guidance 
“that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to all cases of 
national revenue, impeachment of national officers, and questions which 
involve the national peace or harmony.”66  Madison later suggested a further 
simplification of the guidance:  “that the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases 
arising under the Natl. laws:  And to such other questions as may involve the 
Natl. peace & harmony,” which was agreed to without objection.67  The 
 
 60. See 1 id. at 124.  Michael Collins believes that Rutledge moved to reconsider because 
the idea of the legislature appointing judges had been abandoned, and he and others feared 
vesting the power with the president. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court 
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 116–19. 
 61. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125. 
 62. Id.  The records use the word “appoint,” id. at 118, which is the same word used in 
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation as to the Continental Congress’s power to designate 
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas.  Goebel notes that some delegates 
wanted stronger clarification that Congress’s power under the Constitution would be the same 
as under the Articles, with “the state courts participants in the national system.” 1 GOEBEL, 
supra note 12, at 225. 
 63. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 22. 
 66. Id. at 238 (emphasis omitted). 
 67. 2 id. at 46. 
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animating principle of the jurisdiction of the newly federal courts was thus 
distinctively “national.” 
The “cases” and “controversies” listed in Article III, Section 2, which were 
the product of the Committee of Detail with substantial revision and input by 
the Committee of Style, conform to the guidance given by the Committee of 
the Whole.  The nine categories to which the “judicial Power shall extend” 
are: 
 
(1) “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority”; 
 
(2) “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and 
Consuls”; 
 
(3) “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”; 
 
(4) “Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”; 
 
(5) “Controversies between two or more States”; 
(6)   “between a State and Citizens of another State”; 
(7)   “between Citizens of different States”; 
(8)   “between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under  
   Grants of different States”; and 
(9)   “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
 Citizens or Subjects.”68 
 
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction clause uses the same language 
as subheading two and a combination of parts of subheadings five, six, and 
nine:  “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction.”69  The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is 
the only judicial power that the Constitution’s plain language prohibits 
Congress from altering.  Article III states that “the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction”70 without any recognition of congressional power to 
tamper with the jurisdiction.  By contrast, the Supreme Court’s “appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,” “[i]n all the other Cases before 
mentioned,” is subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.”71  The extension of appellate jurisdiction to fact-
finding—as was the case with the state admiralty courts during the Articles 
of Confederation—would be the subject of controversy during the state 
 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 69. Id. cl. 2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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ratification conventions.72  With respect to inferior federal courts, the plain 
language of the Constitution does not require Congress to create them:  “The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . . in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”73 
C.  State Ratification Conventions 
Considerable resistance to the new Constitution in the state ratification 
conventions focused on the national judiciary.  Nineteen of 103 constitutional 
amendments proposed by the six ratifying states that suggested amendments 
dealt with Article III.74  The principal focus of these amendments were: 
(1) Express protection of the right to a jury trial in civil and criminal 
cases.  This was partly a reaction to prior experience with the national court 
of appeals for maritime captures overturning state admiralty court jury 
verdicts.  These concerns produced the “saving to suitors” clause exception 
to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and jury guarantees in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,75 as well as the Sixth Amendment76 and Seventh Amendment 
jury trial protections.77 
(2) Confining appellate power to questions of law, not of fact.  Again, 
this was an important issue because of the prior experience with the Court of 
Appeals in Cases of Capture under the Articles of Confederation, which had 
appellate jurisdiction as to questions of both law and fact, as we have seen.  
And that model was explicitly replicated in Article III with the specification 
of “both as to Law and Fact” in the appellate jurisdiction clause.78  
Constraints on appellate jurisdiction, accordingly, were written into sections 
22 and 25 of the First Judiciary Act by confinement to the writ of error as the 
vehicle for Supreme Court appellate review, which was further 
 
 72. See, e.g., 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
1399 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter DHRC] (reporting that 
Edmund Pendleton, a supporter of the Constitution at the Virginia ratifying convention, 
expressed the sentiment on June 19, 1788, that the words “both as to law and fact” “had been 
buried in oblivion”); id. at 1420 (noting that, on the next day, Patrick Henry, an opponent of 
the Constitution at the same convention, believed that the appellate jurisdiction would “in 
operation destroy the trial by jury”). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 74. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, 
at 286–91 (2010) (Virginia ratifying convention debates); id. at 449–54 (congressional 
discussion of amendments). 
 75. See STEVEN L. SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY AND THE COMMON LAW:  ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 304–21 (2007). 
 76. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 77. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” Id. amend. VII. 
 78. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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circumscribed to the “face of the record” for writs from the state courts,79 
and by the Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause.80 
(3) Elimination of lower federal courts of first instance or limiting 
them to admiralty courts or to what was minimally necessary to enforce 
federal crimes and revenues.81  These reforms were effected by statute, 
and there was no constitutional amendment.  Specifically, in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress was parsimonious in doling out 
lower federal court jurisdiction; most importantly, there was no civil 
“arising under” jurisdiction vested, with the exception of the ATS and 
the provision of jurisdiction for civil forfeitures or penalties under U.S. 
laws on land.  Additionally, the Judiciary Act imposed amount-in-
controversy requirements in sections 9 through 12, and section 34 (the 
Rules of Decision Act) prescribed state rules of decision in cases where 
they applied, ensuring that even if lower federal court jurisdiction 
extended to certain cases at law, the substantive law they would apply 
would be that of the states. 
(4) Elimination of diversity and alienage jurisdictions.  These 
headings of judicial power had been designed to provide alternative 
forums for foreign and out-of-state litigants to protect against potentially 
biased judges and juries in state courts, and, to some extent, biased state 
laws as well.  The Rules of Decision Act preserved the operation of state 
laws in response to these perceptions.  The Judiciary Act’s amount-in-
controversy requirements also cut out smaller-stakes matters under these 
headings.  Moreover, the assignee clause in section 11 prohibited 
collusive assignments to generate diversity jurisdiction, although, as 
noted above, foreign bills of exchange were exempted from the ambit of 
the assignee clause. 
In summary, the First Congress addressed most of the concerns that were 
voiced in the state constitutional ratification debates by provisions in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, to which I turn next.  The notable exceptions to 
statutory fixes were the Sixth and Seventh Amendments targeting protection 
of jury trial rights and particularly jury fact-finding.  The fact that the First 
Congress, which originated the entire Bill of Rights, decided to address these 
particular constitutional concerns largely by subconstitutional fixes presents 
an interesting solution and is a testimony to the genius of the First Judiciary 
Act as a landmark framework statute establishing the federal court system. 
D.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 
Implementing Article III and setting up the national judiciary were high 
priorities when the First Congress met in the fall of 1789.  George 
 
 79. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84–87. 
 80. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, . . . no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 81. See Charles Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 49, 66–68, 119–27 (1923). 
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Washington signed the First Judiciary Act into law on September 24, 1789.82  
The statute established the Supreme Court as well as lower circuit and district 
courts, defined their respective jurisdictions and terms, and provided for 
court staff (clerks, marshals, and U.S. attorneys).83  It set up a Supreme Court 
with a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, thirteen district courts in the 
eleven states that had ratified the Constitution (not North Carolina and Rhode 
Island), and district courts for the part of Massachusetts that would become 
Maine and the part of Virginia that would become Kentucky.84  The eleven 
district courts were further grouped into three circuits:  (1) Eastern 
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York); (2) Middle 
(Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); and (3) 
Southern (Georgia and South Carolina).85  Circuit courts consisting of two 
Supreme Court Justices and the resident district judge were to be held twice 
a year in each district, with a two-judge quorum and any district judge 
recused “in any case of appeal or error from his own decision.”86 
Three considerations are worth keeping in mind when contemplating the 
geographical distribution of the district courts and the system of circuit courts 
and Supreme Court Justices’ circuit riding.  First, in a nod to their importance 
as commercial (predominantly maritime) courts, the new federal district 
courts were sited at principal sea and riverine ports, with the exceptions of 
Williamsburg, Virginia, the colonial capital, and Harrodsburg, Kentucky, 
which was the largest settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains at the 
time.87  Second, there was an obvious balancing between the interest in 
having a small federal judiciary for reasons of cost and avoiding 
encroachment on state courts, on the one hand, and the interest in having both 
trial courts and initial appeals courts spread throughout the country for 
reasons of geographical convenience for potential litigants, on the other hand.  
The First Judiciary Act ordained an extremely compact court system—
nineteen judges total; thirteen fixed district courts in commercial centers; and 
the Supreme Court at the capital, with the six Supreme Court Justices riding 
circuit to convene twice-a-year circuit courts in the districts with the resident 
district judge.  Third, less obvious but equally important, was the fact that the 
thirteen district judges and the six Supreme Court Justices when riding circuit 
represented the most senior federal officers appointed by the president “on 
the ground” in the states in the late eighteenth century, an era in which the 
federal government was an exceedingly modest going concern.  President 
George Washington expressed the sentiment aptly in his cover letter 
transmitting the commission to serve as “Associate Judge in the Supreme 
Court of the United States” to John Rutledge of South Carolina on September 
30, 1789, six days after the Judiciary Act became law:  “Considering the 
Judicial System as the chief Pillar upon which our national Government must 
 
 82. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 83. Id. §§ 1–3, 1 Stat at 73–74. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74. 
 86. Id. §§ 4–5, 1 Stat. at 74–75. 
 87. Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73–74. 
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rest, I have thought it my duty to nominate, for the high Offices in that 
department, such men as I conceived would give dignity and lustre to our 
National Character.”88 
We turn now to the First Judiciary Act’s key provisions defining the 
jurisdiction and powers of the three newly created categories of federal 
courts.  They are important because they dole out the “judicial power of the 
United States” as specified in Article III—the legal authority of the three tiers 
of newly created federal courts to decide cases and controversies brought 
before them.  The provisions are familiar enough to federal courts experts.  
However, there is fresh insight to be gained from understanding how the 
jurisdictions and powers were specified, and, more importantly, how the 
different sections fit together.  Too often, judges, lawyers, and scholars treat 
the parts of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as if they were independent statutes 
(e.g., the ATS or the Rules of Decision Act), rather than interlocking parts of 
a single framework enactment. 
1.  District Court Original Jurisdiction 
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 detailed the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the newly created district courts.  Section 10 applied only to 
the district courts in Kentucky and Maine (soon-to-be-independent parts of 
Virginia and Massachusetts, respectively) and contained special provisions 
for appeals and writs of errors from those courts but otherwise replicated the 
six categories of jurisdiction specified in section 9.  That section provided for 
district court original jurisdiction as follows. 
Jurisdiction exclusive of state courts for: 
(1) “all crimes and offences . . . cognizable under the authority of the 
United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the 
high seas” with punishment not to exceed thirty lashes, a one-hundred-
dollar fine, or six months’ imprisonment; 
(2) “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” including 
seizures under U.S. “impost, navigation or trade” laws on navigable 
waters or on the high seas, “saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of 
a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give 
it”; 
(3) “all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made” for 
penalties and forfeitures under U.S. laws; and 
(4) “all suits against consuls or vice-consuls,” unless for crimes or 
offenses exceeding “aforesaid” district court jurisdiction.89 
Jurisdiction concurrent with state courts or the circuit courts “as the case 
may be” for: 
(5) “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States”; and 
 
 88. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800, at 21 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DHSC]. 
 89. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77. 
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(6) “all suits at common law where the United States sue” and the amount 
in dispute is up to one hundred dollars.90 
Section 9 also provided that trial of issues of fact in the district courts “in all 
causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by 
jury.” 
2.  Circuit Court Original Jurisdiction and Removal Jurisdiction 
Section 11 extended the jurisdiction of the circuit courts exclusively of 
state courts to “all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the 
United States,” which was concurrent with the district courts as to the minor 
offenses listed in section 9.91  And section 11 also gave jurisdiction 
concurrently to the state courts over “all suits of a civil nature at common 
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds” five hundred dollars 
and the “United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners” or “an alien is party, or 
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a 
citizen of another State.”  Section 11 further specified that the circuit courts 
“shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the district courts under the 
regulations and restrictions herein after provided.”  Section 12 mimicked 
section 11 and provided for removal to the circuit courts (or to a district court 
in the Districts of Maine or Kentucky) for a suit “in any state court brought 
against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against 
the citizen of another state” when the matter in dispute exceeded five hundred 
dollars.92 
3.  Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction and Other Powers 
Section 13 doled out the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction set out in 
Article III, Section 2 as follows: 
 
For “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls” in Article III:   
[T]he Supreme Court . . . .  shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of 
suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their 
domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise 
consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive 
jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, 
or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party.93 
One interesting feature of this provision in the First Judiciary Act is that 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was exclusive as to all suits against 
ambassadors or public ministers (or their family members or domestic 
servants) but concurrent, presumably with state courts, for all suits brought 
by ambassadors or other public ministers.  And although the Article III 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79. 
 92. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79–80. 
 93. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
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provisions mention “consuls” in the same phrase as ambassadors and other 
public ministers, the First Judiciary Act distinguishes them.  As we have seen, 
section 9 provided for district court original jurisdiction, exclusive of state 
courts, for civil suits “against consuls or vice consuls”94 in conjunction with 
section 13’s provision for concurrent original jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court as to “all suits . . . in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party,” 
whether plaintiff or defendant.  As I have explained in previous work, this 
was because consuls and vice consuls were not full-fledged diplomats under 
the law of nations like ambassadors or ministers but rather agents of foreign 
sovereigns who watched over their subjects or citizens and their commercial 
interests.95  In the late eighteenth century, consuls were usually based in the 
commercial port cities where the district courts were located, making these 
courts a logical choice for consular litigation.  Moreover, many consuls and 
vice consuls in the United States were actually U.S. citizens who undertook 
to represent the interests of a foreign state with which they had a personal 
connection or commercial interests.  Regardless, ambassadors, public 
ministers, and consuls or vice consuls alike were surely not intended to be 
covered by the word “alien” in the separate ATS provision of section 9, 
because they had public or quasi-public status and were thus separately and 
explicitly provided for in the First Judiciary Act.  This is an important point 
often overlooked in commentary on the ATS that becomes self-evident when 
one scrutinizes the different jurisdictional provisions of the Act together. 
 
For “those in which a State shall be Party”:   
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a 
state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other 
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.96 
In prior work, I argued that the state-as-party half of the Supreme Court’s 
Article III original jurisdiction included suits brought by a foreign “state as 
party” against one or more U.S. states for treaty violations, most notably of 
the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.97  That foreign relations function 
would have increased the essential role of this aspect of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction in the original constitutional plan for the federal judiciary.  And 
we have already examined how Article IX of the Articles of Confederation 
 
 94. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77. 
 95. See Lee, supra note 4, at 855–63. 
 96. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
 97. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-international 
Tribunal:  Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based 
Suits Brought by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) 
(asserting that the Constitution “vests in the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over suits against States brought by foreign states alleging violation of ratified treaties of the 
United States”).  I argued that this original jurisdiction survives the passage of the Eleventh 
Amendment and subsequent Supreme Court precedents, including Principality of Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). See id. at 1770–75. 
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provided for this important jurisdiction to decide controversies between 
states.98  On a textualist note, the antecedent of “those” would appear to be 
“all Cases,” as used in the “affecting Ambassadors” part of the original 
jurisdiction clause, but, as noted above, the word “Controversies,” not “all 
Cases,” is used in Article III, Section 2’s enumeration of the disputes in 
which a state might be party.  Section 13 of the Judiciary Act, in turn, uses 
the phrase “all controversies of a civil nature.” 
Section 13 also specified that “the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme 
Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by 
jury.”99  That the Judiciary Act’s specification of the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction provided for jury trials to any degree100 suggests that the 
Court’s original jurisdiction was viewed as identical to the original 
jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts.  The only differences were the 
more exalted status of the forum and the number of judges—a quorum of six, 
as opposed to three or one.  The Supreme Court’s exercise of its original 
jurisdiction today, however, is very different from that of the lower courts, 
particularly in that fact-finding is done by a special master, not by jury.  
Article III does not say anything one way or the other, of course.  Moreover, 
Congress no longer provides for exclusive original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court for suits by states against citizens of the United States (or 
actions against ambassadors or public ministers).101 
As a textual matter, the state-as-party provision in section 13 may be read 
to encompass suits brought by citizens of other states or aliens against a state.  
If so, then it would have possibly permitted suit in the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction by these private plaintiffs pleading state violations of the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.  This would have enabled 
a powerful tool of Supreme Court judicial review of state laws.  But the 
Eleventh Amendment—proposed by Congress in 1794 and declared to be 
part of the Constitution in 1798—explicitly foreclosed such suits. 
Section 13 additionally spelled out the Supreme Court’s judicial powers 
outside of its mandatory original jurisdiction.  Section 13 provided that the 
“Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts 
and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided 
 
 98. See supra Parts I.A.3–4. 
 99. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
 100. An account of the only reported jury trial at the Supreme Court, Georgia v. Brailsford, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), surmises that the jury was a Mansfieldian “special jury” culled from 
a venire of merchants with specialized knowledge regarding the contesting claims between 
Georgia and a British private creditor as to a 1774 bond owed by a Georgia citizen. See 
Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 211 (2013). 
 101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  The statutory specification of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction is now not only nonexclusive, it extends only to “actions or proceedings to which 
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties.” Id. 
§ 1251(b)(1).  There are, I suppose, plausible arguments that Supreme Court original 
jurisdiction that is nonexclusive jurisdiction but never in fact exercised offends the holding in 
Marbury that Congress may not alter the Court’s original jurisdiction, and that the present 
specification does not cover “all Cases affecting” foreign ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, 
such as those involving their families and domestic servants as set forth in section 13 of the 
First Judiciary Act. 
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for.”102  A separate provision in section 13 also granted the Supreme Court 
power “to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding 
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”  Finally, it authorized the 
Court to issue “writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and 
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the 
authority of the United States.”103  This mandamus provision was famously 
held to be unconstitutional in Marbury, on the view that it enlarged the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, which Congress lacked the power to 
do because Article III’s specification could not be altered.104 
Section 14 gave all federal courts the “power to issue writs of scire facias, 
habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute which 
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”105  The power of Supreme 
Court Justices and district court judges to grant writs of habeas corpus under 
section 14, however, was limited to prisoners in custody under federal 
authority, or committed to trial or necessary for testimony in federal court. 
4.  Equity Jurisdiction 
Section 16 provided that “suits in equity shall not be sustained in . . . the 
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete 
remedy may be had at law.”106  Section 19 provided that “it shall be the duty 
of circuit courts, in causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction, to cause the facts on which they found their sentence or decree, 
fully to appear upon the record.”107  Notwithstanding section 16’s 
requirement of first resort to remedies at law, equity causes were important 
in land grant cases, a prominent and important category of cases in federal 
courts in the late eighteenth century. 
5.  Circuit and Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction from Federal Courts 
Sections 21 and 22 provided the specifics regarding appellate jurisdiction 
from district court to circuit court, as promised in section 11.  Section 21 
provided that “from final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value 
of three hundred dollars . . . an appeal shall be allowed to the next circuit 
court, to be held in such district.”108  Section 22 provided that 
final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, where the 
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars . . . may be re-
examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court . . . upon a writ of 
error . . . .  And upon a like process, may final judgments and decrees in 
 
 102. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
 103. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 104. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–80 (1803). 
 105. Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82. 
 106. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82–83. 
 107. Id. § 19, 1 Stat. at 83. 
 108. Id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 83–84. 
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civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court . . . where the matter in 
dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars . . . be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court . . . .  But there 
shall be no reversal in either court on such writ of error for error in ruling 
any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, or 
such plea to a petition or bill in equity, as is in the nature of a demurrer, or 
for any error in fact.109 
Section 4 separately provided that “no district judge shall give a vote in any 
case of appeal or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of 
such his decision.”110  Interestingly, there was no similar disqualification in 
the Judiciary Act for Supreme Court Justices from voting in cases of appeal 
or error from their own circuit court decisions, perhaps because it would have 
left the six-Justice Court shorthanded in too many cases. 
Section 22 refers to both civil actions and equity suits, permitting review 
upon writ of error to the Supreme Court.  Strangely, section 21 does not 
explicitly provide for “appeal” to the Supreme Court from a circuit court in 
admiralty and maritime cases after an appeal to the circuit court from a 
district court.  (Nor is there any appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal 
cases.)  Section 13 separately authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of 
prohibition to the district courts “when proceeding as courts of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.”111  That writ gave the Court the power to stop the 
district courts from going ahead with exercising jurisdiction in an admiralty 
or maritime case upon a successful petition for the writ.  But any appeal of 
issues decided by the district court in an admiralty or maritime case would 
lie only to the circuit court under section 21, subject to the three-hundred-
dollar amount-in-controversy requirement.  Regardless, the Supreme Court 
from the start entertained writs of error from the circuit courts in admiralty 
and maritime cases, and so the absence of reference to appeals or writs of 
error in such cases seems to be a drafting oversight. 
6.  Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction from State Courts 
Section 25 detailed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction from the 
state courts: 
That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or 
equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn 
in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised 
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity . . . may 
be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the 
United States upon a writ of error . . . .  But no other error shall be assigned 
or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such 
as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before 
 
 109. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84–85. 
 110. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. 
 111. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
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mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, 
treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.112 
Section 25 did not provide for any reexamination by the Court upon a writ 
of error with respect to a judgment or decree from the highest state court in a 
suit in which the state court had decided in favor of the validity of a treaty, 
statute, or authority of the United States.  Additionally, any reexamination by 
the Supreme Court was limited to error that appeared “on the face of the 
record” and “immediately respects” the validity of the federal treaty, statute, 
or authority in dispute.  And, most importantly, review was by “writ of error,” 
not “appeal,” foreclosing the possibility of any reexamination of facts, 
whether by jury or judge.  Consequently, the First Congress strongly 
implemented its Article III, Section 2 power to “make” “exceptions” and 
“regulations” to the Supreme Court’s “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law 
and Fact,” which had occasioned such hostility in the state ratifying 
conventions.113  This exceedingly narrow specification of the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction from the state courts lasted until 1867. 
7.  Rules of Decision Act 
But what law would the new federal courts apply in their exercise of the 
Article III judicial powers that the First Congress had vested in them in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789?  Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act—the Rules of 
Decision Act—prescribed that “the laws of the several states, except where 
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common 
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”114  For a 
century after its 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,115 the Supreme Court 
construed section 34 to include “strictly local” state laws, including statutes 
(and the “construction thereof adopted by local tribunals”) as well as “rights 
and titles” pertaining to real property or other “intraterritorial” matters but 
not to “questions of general commercial law.”116  But in 1938, the Court in 
Erie, relying in part on Charles Warren’s interpretation of the Senate bill 
version of section 34, held that “laws of the several states” included all state 
judicial decisions and that federal courts did not have the power to invoke 
“general law” as rules of decision when their judicial power was based on the 
Article III, Section 2 grant as to controversies “between citizens of different 
States.”117  That was, of course, only one of the nine grants of judicial power, 
 
 112. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86. 
 113. In theory, until the ratification of the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh 
Amendment in December 1791, the Court might have still reexamined and reversed jury fact-
findings challenged by writ of error from the highest law court of a state so long as an error 
appeared “on the face of the record.”  But there is no evidence that this was ever attempted or 
done in any of the handful of Supreme Court cases docketed in 1791. 
 114. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92 (Rules of Decision Act). 
 115. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
 116. Id. at 18–19.  
 117. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73, 73 n.5. 
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however, and all of the other grants implicated the law of nations either 
directly or indirectly to the extent that the law of nations was a source for the 
U.S. law of interstate relations.118  It is not my intent to delve at length into 
the rich and complex debates regarding the Erie doctrine; it suffices for 
present purposes to note that section 34 had two important limitations:  it 
only applied to “trials at common law” and only then “in cases where [the 
laws of the several states] apply.”119  In other words, state laws, whether 
statutes or judicial decisions, did not apply in equity causes or in admiralty 
and maritime suits in federal court and might in theory not “apply” even in 
“trials at common law.”  State rules of decision were thus the exception, not 
the norm, for the small set of suits in federal courts under the original plan of 
1787–1792, a point Wilfred Ritz has made.120  That is consistent with the 
reality that the original and removal jurisdictions of the federal courts were 
so limited, as elaborated in detail above, precisely to preserve state court 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
Four summary points may be made about the design and implementation 
of the federal courts contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  First, it is 
important to get an integrated understanding of how all the specifications of 
the judicial power were implemented.  Take the ATS for example.  The 
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain121 concluded that the ATS was 
originally enacted to address three late eighteenth-century paradigm law-of-
nations violations—piracy, attacks against ambassadors, and violations of 
safe conducts.122  Given that the ATS is a part of section 9 that gives 
concurrent jurisdiction to state and circuit courts, and a different clause of 
section 9 gives the district courts exclusive admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction subject to the saving-to-suitors clause, it is implausible to assert 
that the ATS had anything to do with piracy.  Furthermore, section 13 gave 
the Supreme Court “original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits 
brought by ambassadors,” with the implication that concurrent jurisdiction 
would be exercised not by district courts in the diverse states but by the courts 
of the state or district of the national capital (first New York and then the 
District of Columbia), where ambassadors were received and restricted 
unless given freedom of movement by the president.  The ATS, by contrast, 
specified district court jurisdiction concurrent with state and circuit courts.  
 
 118. See Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707, 
1709 (2018) (“The law of nations was the original federal common law.  By this I mean that 
the law of nations was to be the default source of rules of decision for federal courts to apply 
in cases and controversies before them ‘except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of 
the United States otherwise require or provide,’ pursuant to parts of all nine grants of judicial 
power in Article III . . . .” (quoting ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92)). 
 119. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. 
 120. See generally WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 
1789:  EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt & 
L. H. LaRue eds., 1990). 
 121. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 122. Id. at 724 (finding “no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond 
those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses [of the law of nations]:  
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”). 
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The upshot is that the ATS was enacted solely to address safe-conducts and 
did not address piracy or ambassadorial infringements at all.123  That 
conclusion only becomes obvious by a careful examination of all the 
jurisdictional provisions of the First Judiciary Act together, not just the ATS 
clause in section 9. 
Second, the original jurisdiction of the new federal courts was exceedingly 
narrow in comparison to what Article III authorized in terms of the judicial 
power of the United States.  The district courts had exclusive original 
jurisdiction over:  (1) low-level federal crimes and seizures on land or inland 
waters, applying the Article III arising under judicial power; (2) civil causes 
in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which included maritime seizures 
under U.S. customs laws (subject to the saving-to-suitors clause), implicating 
the Article III admiralty and maritime power; and (3) suits against consuls or 
vice consuls, implicating the Article III power as to all cases “affecting 
ambassadors, public ministers, or consuls.”124  And they had concurrent 
original jurisdiction when the United States was plaintiff and less than one 
hundred dollars was at issue, involving the Article III United States-as-party 
power; and for alien tort claims, for which the United States bore sovereign 
responsibility, since it owed a duty of protection to friendly and neutral 
aliens, under treaties and the law of nations, implicating the Article III arising 
under power.125  The circuit courts had exclusive federal crime jurisdiction, 
implicating the arising under power; ATS jurisdiction concurrent with the 
district courts; original and removal jurisdiction concurrent with the state 
courts of “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity” exceeding 
five hundred dollars when the “United States are plaintiffs or petitioners,” 
applying part of the Article III United States-as-party power; and jurisdiction 
when “an alien is party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the 
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State,” implicating the foreign and 
citizen diversity headings of Article III.126  And the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction, as we have seen, was confined exclusively to ambassadorial and 
state-as-party cases, hewing closely to the two halves of the Article III 
original jurisdiction clause.127  What is clear is that the First Congress was 
exceedingly parsimonious in doling out land-based Article III power given 
the concerns about encroachment on state judicial power and juries expressed 
at the Constitutional Convention and the state ratification conventions. 
Third, although Article III authorized “appellate” jurisdiction “both as to 
Law and Fact” in the wide-ranging sense of the Court of Appeals in Cases of 
Capture under the Articles, the First Congress did not follow the lead of the 
Continental Congress on such jurisdiction.  The Judiciary Act, in sections 22 
and 25, severely limited the Supreme Court to review by writ of error in civil 
 
 123. See Lee, supra note 4, at 836 (concluding that the “ATS was enacted to allow aliens 
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 124. See ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. at 78–80. 
 127. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
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actions and equity suits from the lower federal courts and the highest state 
courts of law and equity, the latter only as to what was evident on the face of 
the record and “immediately” respecting the validity of a federal law or 
authority that the state court had struck down.  In fact, there was no explicit 
provision made as to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as to admiralty 
and maritime cases from the district courts, nor any appellate jurisdiction 
from state court decisions that upheld federal treaties, statutes, or authorities. 
The creation of lower federal courts that were optional to Congress under 
Article III may have mitigated the perceived need for such appellate 
jurisdiction.  But whatever the reason, the First Congress aggressively 
exercised its Article III, Section 2 power to “make” exceptions to the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
At the same time, Congress went very broad in implementing the Supreme 
Court’s Article III original jurisdiction for “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
public Ministers, and Consuls” and for when a state is a party.  For instance, 
in section 13 of the Judiciary Act, Congress provided for exclusive original 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for cases involving an ambassador’s 
“domestics, or domestic servants” and extended nonexclusive original 
jurisdiction to vice consuls, a largely honorific quasi-diplomatic position that 
was arguably not within Article III’s specification of “all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls.”  The contrast in these 
two aspects of the First Judiciary Act’s doling out of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction—appellate versus original—confirms the sense that the First 
Congress believed that the Constitution required thorough vesting of the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, particularly as compared to its 
parsimonious vesting of appellate jurisdiction, particularly of state courts. 
Finally, it bears noting how much the Judiciary Act’s specifications of 
judicial power were oriented to the foreign policy picture and to providing 
dispute resolution favorable to foreign emissaries and merchants, particularly 
in the maritime setting.  There was little evident interest in bringing the newly 
created federal courts to bear for domestic governance concerns or the 
vindication of Americans’—as opposed to foreigners’—rights, outside of the 
enclaves of federal crimes and U.S. enforcement actions (e.g., land seizures 
for customs collection or habeas corpus when in federal custody) and 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  Indeed, the only land-based resort to 
federal judicial power that a U.S. citizen-plaintiff could access, absent the 
implication of a foreign party, seems to be the “Citizens of different States” 
diversity jurisdiction,128 subject to a five-hundred-dollar amount-in-
controversy requirement. 
In addition to the establishment of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts and the specifications of judicial power, the First Judiciary Act also 
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set forth some basic rules of evidence129 and jury selection.130  However, it 
did not otherwise address procedures to be used in the new federal courts, 
including whether they were to proceed as a general matter under the 
procedural rules then in use in England and in the states. 
E.  The First Process Act 
The First Congress tackled the vital lacuna of procedures in the Judiciary 
Act in an enactment that became law five days later, on September 29, 1789.  
This statute was titled “An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the 
United States.”131  It originated in the same Senate committee of the First 
Congress that had drafted the Judiciary Act.  It was most likely drafted by 
the same person who was the principal architect of the Judiciary Act, Senator 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, who was later appointed the third Chief 
Justice of the United States.132 
The First Process Act has not received the sort of scholarly attention one 
might have expected for what was effectively the first federal civil procedure 
statute.  Part of this may be attributable to the fact that it was supposed to be 
temporary—Congress provided that it was to “continue in force until the end 
of the next session of Congress and no longer.”133  The statute proved to be 
longer lived:  the next two Congresses ended up voting to continue the 
Process Act of 1789, and a new process act was not passed until May 8, 
1792.134  Another reason for the low profile of the statute may be its 
concision.  The entire statute consists of 328 words in three sections.135  The 
original Senate bill had been much more detailed, but the Senate pared it 
down, ostensibly to prevent undue wrangling with the House of 
Representatives.136 
One major controversy was not averted, however.  The original Senate bill 
of the First Process Act had provided “[t]hat all Writs & Processes issuing 
out of any of the Courts of the United States, shall be in the name of the 
President of the United States of America.”137  Some senators chafed at this 
whiff of the British king’s writs;138 such objections were joined by like-
 
 129. Ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. at 82 (“[P]ower in the trial of actions at law, on motion and due 
notice . . . to require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or 
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minded members of the House.  When the bill reached the House, 
Representative Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland moved to strike the words 
“the President of” so that writs would run from the United States, in which 
sovereignty rightfully reposed.139  A “warm and animated” debate resulted, 
and the House passed Stone’s amendment by a 25 to 18 vote.140  But the 
Senate stuck to its guns and rejected the House’s amended bill.  The House 
also refused to back down, voting 28 to 22 to press the amendment upon 
return from the Senate.141  The impasse, on a matter that seems trivial to the 
modern legal mind, was resolved only when the two bodies agreed not to say 
anything at all about from whom writs and processes would issue.  This 
resolution punted the fraught issue to the newly created judiciary.142 
The incident highlighted the hostility to implementing legal practices 
redolent of British monarchy in the new national courts.  The royal writ was 
the key for litigants to unlock the king’s courts, and it was framed as a royal 
command to the defendant or to the sheriff.  The whole point of the American 
War of Independence had been to slip the yoke of royal commands, and it 
seemed antithetical to that purpose to substitute the command of a president 
for that of a king.  More generally, a significant segment of the American 
people had come to be wary of the political and legal institutions of the 
country with which they had just fought a bloody and vicious war of 
separation.  It was natural for them to seek other sources of inspiration for 
designing the revolutionary republic’s governance institutions, including its 
courts.  One important such source was the practices of the various states, but 
those were also ultimately derived from English common-law models.  The 
only other plausible source was the civil law tradition, descended from 
Roman law, which had an important enclave in the British admiralty courts. 
The controversy over who originates writs illuminates how the design of 
the new republic’s legal practices sought departures from English legal 
tradition in certain respects, but it was small beer compared to another part 
of the First Process Act, which directly invoked the civil law tradition.  The 
statute’s key operative provision does not set forth actual procedural rules 
but rather, ordains choices of procedural law for the three categories of cases 
expected to constitute the main business of the new federal courts:  (1) suits 
at common law, (2) causes of equity, and (3) suits in admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.  The latter two categories in fact would come to constitute the 
lion’s share of the work of the early national courts, which is unsurprising 
since the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over all suits at common 
law.  With respect to equity causes and maritime and admiralty suits, the 
Process Act prescribed that “the forms and modes of proceedings . . . shall 
be according to the course of the civil law.”143  As we shall see, it is almost 
certain that the First Congress was directing federal judges to apply 
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procedural rules according to the evolving practice of civilian courts like the 
British admiralty courts and continental European courts, not the rules of the 
state courts or of the English common-law courts.  This is an astonishing and 
little-remarked innovation. 
Before discussing the puzzling provision, we need to address the 
preliminary question of why Congress chose to vest multiple judicial powers 
in the same court.  A fusion of judicial powers in one court (law and equity) 
was a common feature in civil law countries (including Scotland), but it was 
anathema in England.  The common-law courts were the masters of law, and 
the Court of Chancery was the dispenser of equity.  The splitting into two of 
the rule-of-law atom was an axiom of the English legal order but foreign to 
the civil law legal order.  The two institutions evolved a long and famous 
history of mutual suspicion and rivalry, and the English believed that 
combining them in one organ was a dangerous fusion of power.144  But that 
was what the First Congress did,145 and in an even greater departure from the 
English example, they also vested the new national courts with the all-
important admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which had been the separate 
province of the civilian admiralty courts in England.146 
It is unclear exactly why the business of three courts in England (the 
common-law courts, Chancery, and the admiralty courts) was put into one 
new national court in the United States,147 so it is hard to say for sure if the 
Framers were influenced by the civilian norm of a unitary court with law and 
equity powers.  James Pfander and Daniel Birk have read the constitutional 
extension of “judicial power . . . to all Cases, in Law and Equity” in Article 
III, Section 2 as pointing to a unitary court influenced by the civilian-based 
Scottish model,148 but that provision does not have to be read to mean that 
“all Cases, in Law and Equity” requires vesting both law and equity cases in 
the same court.  The First Congress could have created law courts and equity 
courts and still been in compliance with Article III. 
Although the Constitution does not require it, the First Congress did fuse 
common-law and equity powers, along with the admiralty and maritime 
power, in one system of courts through the First Judiciary Act.  The trifold 
fusion inspired strong objections based on the English example, including 
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from future Justice Samuel Chase.149  My own view is that Congress may 
have overridden such objections not necessarily out of a desire to emulate the 
Scottish or civilian model but because they wanted to create a compact 
judiciary to save money and mitigate the fear that the new courts would 
transgress the business of the state courts.  For instance, Robert Treat Paine, 
a future justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, wrote to Caleb 
Strong, a member of the Senate committee that originated the bill, and 
“suggested combining the admiralty and revenue jurisdictions rather than 
having them referred to separate courts.”150  The fact that the First Congress 
seems to have thought they had the discretion to combine or not to combine 
suggests, contrary to Pfander’s and Birk’s theory, that Article III’s reference 
to “Cases, in Law and Equity” is inconclusive on a requirement of unity. 
But let us return to the main event of the choices made by the First Process 
Act.  It prescribed two choices of procedural law:  one for the common-law 
causes of action and one for equity causes and admiralty and maritime suits 
combined.  Before discussing the specific prescriptions, it is useful to 
consider the range of possible choices.  The First Congress could have:  (1) 
applied state procedural rules; (2) drafted their own procedural rules by 
statute; (3) allowed the federal judiciary to make their own rules; or (4) 
adopted the rules of the English courts—common law, equity, and admiralty. 
For the law side, the Senate had originally passed a bill prescribing 
procedural rules (option two) with a carveout for state rules as to “executions 
in actions” and fees,151 but Congress ended up choosing state rules (option 
one).  To be specific, with respect to “suits at common law,” the First Process 
Act declared that “except where . . . otherwise provided” by federal statutes, 
“the forms of writs and executions . . . and modes of process and rates of 
fees . . . in the circuit and district courts . . . shall be the same in each state 
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the 
same.”152  The choice of state procedural law for suits at law was 
unsurprising:  each of the new states had their own settled common-law 
courts, which had evolved particular ways of regulating procedures.  The 
local bar would not have welcomed a new set of rules for actions at law that 
might be entertained in the local federal courts too, for instance by virtue of 
diversity jurisdiction.  This part of the First Process Act also tracked the Rule 
of Decisions Act’s prescription of state substantive law “in trials at common 
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”153  The law 
side of the statute has been the subject of a good deal of judicial and scholarly 
commentary, most notably for its quixotic, static command that the relevant 
state procedures were those “now used or allowed” in 1789 and implicitly 
not thereafter.154 
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It is the other choice of procedural law in the First Process Act for equity 
causes and admiralty and maritime suits that is surprising.  Neither the 
original Senate bill nor the final act adopted one of the four logical options 
suggested above.  Instead, for “causes of equity, and of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction,” section 2 of the Process Act prescribed that “the forms 
and modes of proceedings . . . shall be according to the course of the civil 
law.”  One threshold interpretive question is whether the phrase “according 
to the course of the civil law” contemplated reference to the English 
Chancery Court with respect to equity causes.  Chancery had civilian roots, 
but unlike the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, it had evolved a distinct 
identity in England by the late eighteenth century.  Although, it is almost 
certain that Chancery practice would not have been characterized as 
“common law” procedure, it seems improbable that Congress and early 
American lawyers would have viewed it as part of “the course of the civil 
law.”  Thus, despite the model of Chancery practice, it appears that these 
words in the Process Act directed the new national courts to use the Roman-
law-based procedural rules of continental Europe and Scotland to govern 
their “forms and modes of proceeding” in equity, as well as in admiralty and 
maritime suits.  With respect to maritime and admiralty suits, the English 
admiralty courts were civilian institutions and so they were already applying 
civil law procedures, although inflected by local usage over the decades.  
Why did the First Congress opt for Roman-law-based, civil law procedures 
in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction suits?  Goebel posed a theory 
of negative motive:  the choice of civil law was due to postwar hostility 
against English practice in the Court of Chancery and admiralty courts.155  
“The Committee had earlier experienced the explosions over adopting 
English chancery practice during the Judiciary Act debates . . . and it may 
have been conceived that something less contentious was being tendered.”156  
English law did seem like the most logical choice:  American lawyers knew 
it, and it promised a benefit comparable to civil law in terms of uniform rules 
across the states and with England.  State rules, as on the law side, were also 
plausible in theory, although the more flexible nature of equity made it likely 
that procedures had evolved greater differences over time among the states.  
Another problem with using state rules was that there were separate courts of 
chancery in only five of the then states—Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
South Carolina, and Virginia—and their rules were modeled on English 
chancery anyway.157  Goebel does not shirk from expressing his opinion of 
the provision for civil law practice actually enacted:  he called it “done in 
haste,” “ill advised,” and “unrealistic.”158  He believed it was “idle to suppose 
that the judges or the practitioners . . . were likely to set afoot unfamiliar and 
untried procedures.”159 
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Goebel is surely correct about anti-English sentiment, but his negative 
theory may be incomplete because it neglects an important positive motive:  
the First Congress imported the “course of the civil law” to govern 
procedures for equity and admiralty suits in federal court because they 
wanted to encourage continental European merchants—Dutch, French, 
Prussian—who were more familiar with civilian procedures derived from 
Roman law, to trade and do business with, and lend money to, Americans.  
Such dealings, especially with denizens of a new revolutionary “republic” 
run by former freedom fighters and led by their general, are always haunted 
by the specter of unreliable dispute resolution in the developing country’s 
courts if the deals falter.  The state courts, with their partisan juries and arcane 
procedures of English origin, were notoriously hostile to foreign and out-of-
state commercial interests, particularly creditors.160 
To counteract this reality, Congress tried to make the new general courts 
as cosmopolitan and user-friendly as possible for continental European 
merchants, shippers, and bankers.  The First Process Act prescribed “forms 
and modes of proceedings” in equity, maritime, and admiralty suits 
“according to the course of the civil law.”161  And of course there was no jury 
in equity, maritime, or admiralty, suits.  By the expansion of equity, 
maritime, and admiralty jurisdiction, the national courts might further erode 
local juries, a concern that animated the saving-to-suitors clause of the 
admiralty jurisdiction grant.162  Furthermore, as noted above, the Judiciary 
Act gave foreigners special access to the federal courts for injuries to their 
persons or properties (alien torts) that Americans did not have.163  Finally, in 
“cases of foreign bills of exchange,” the First Judiciary Act accorded a 
special right to serve process on a defendant in a district other than where he 
lived or was served and for an assignee of a promissory note to sue in federal 
court even if the assignor could not have.164  The former was the earliest 
example of a nationwide process rule, which today is limited to federal 
question suits,165 although a modern analogue would likely be constitutional 
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under the Fifth Amendment, because the defendant would be a U.S. resident 
with “minimum contacts” with the United States.  Process served by state 
courts was necessarily limited by the borders of the relevant state; the 
creation of a national court system that enabled nationwide process posed a 
real risk of inconvenience and cost to American defendants who would 
strongly prefer to be sued, if at all, near home.  The nationwide process and 
assignment exceptions for “foreign bills of exchange” in the Judiciary Act 
are, accordingly, consistent with the theme of preferential treatment and 
privileges in federal court for foreign merchants and creditors in suits against 
Americans.  This accommodation of foreign European interests with respect 
to procedural rules complemented the Rules of Decision Act’s implicit 
reservation of decisional rules in equity, admiralty, and maritime suits to 
federal judicial discretion, because state substantive laws, presumptively 
tending to favor in-state citizens, would only supply “rules of decision in 
trials at common law . . . in cases where they apply.”166 
By way of postscript, Goebel was right.  Lawyers resented the innovation 
and persisted in settled ways.  The provision drew intense fire from the first 
U.S. attorney general, Edmund Randolph, who emphatically expressed his 
concerns in a 1790 report to the House of Representatives: 
A diversity of opinion has prevailed on the forms and modes, to be 
observed in causes of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:  
Whether they are to be according to the mere civil law, unqualified by the 
usages of any modern nation, or under limitations? 
If the untempered severity of the Roman law is to predominate, the rights 
of property, and of personal liberty, are in jeopardy:  Without exhibiting a 
tedious list of what are termed the substantial and accidental parts of a civil 
cause, let a few of the most obnoxious forms of the civil law be selected.167 
Randolph’s problems with civilian procedure included its overreliance on 
oaths, the relative ease with which arrests could be made and property 
sequestered, its practice of turning an estate over to a plaintiff to satisfy 
judgment, and the “insult” to a judge countenanced by automatic grants of 
dilatory exceptions in proceedings without a trial to enforce a schedule on 
the litigants and the judge.168  These do appear to have been aspects of civil 
law procedure, and it is impressive that Randolph knew them well enough to 
criticize real drawbacks of civilian practice vis-à-vis English equity.  He 
proposed replacing civil law procedures with English ones:  “It cannot be 
denied, that the nation, whose jurisprudence is the source of our own, 
presents the best limitations; and that they ought to be adopted, until better 
shall be devised.”169 
Notwithstanding Randolph’s criticisms, “forms and modes of 
proceedings . . . according to the course of the civil law” continued as the law 
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on the books governing equity, admiralty, and maritime suits in federal court 
for two and a half more years.  When the Second Congress met in October 
1791, a revision was high on the agenda.  The initial Senate committee 
wanted to keep the law as it was, but the full Senate made a complete reversal 
and changed it to “state practice.”170  Surprisingly, it was the House that 
suggested the less state-deferential version that was enacted:  “according to 
the principles, rules, and usages which belong to Courts of equity” or courts 
of admiralty, respectively.171  The lower courts were given “discretion” to 
make “alterations and additions” to these rules that they deemed “expedient.”  
And the Supreme Court was authorized to make “such regulations as [it] shall 
think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district 
court concerning the same.”172  The formulation was deceptively general, for 
it allowed lawyers to stick to the American and English procedural rules they 
knew best. 
F.  The First Supreme Court Case 
We have just seen how the First Congress adopted civil law procedures to 
encourage European merchants to use the new national courts for dispute 
resolution.  It should be no surprise that the very first case with which the 
Supreme Court had to grapple also involved international commerce.  But 
this time the issue was public debt:  specifically, sovereign debt that the states 
had incurred to finance the War of Independence.  The national government, 
led by Alexander Hamilton,173 would eventually implement a political 
solution by assuming much of the state sovereign debt.  In the meantime, 
frustrated creditors contemplated their litigation options. 
Vanstophorst v. Maryland,174 the first case on the docket of the Supreme 
Court, showcased the most important constitutional question in the first 
decade after ratification:  whether the Constitution permitted foreign and out-
of-state private creditors to adjudicate state sovereign debt cases in the 
Court.175  In their efforts to secure ratification of the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 81 and James Madison and John Marshall at the 
Virginia ratifying convention had asserted that the Article III enumeration of 
judicial power as to “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of 
another State . . . [or foreign] Citizens or subjects” did not extend to suits 
against an unconsenting state in federal court.176  But a number of such suits 
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were quickly filed in the Supreme Court as soon as it was established.  At 
issue were two foundations of states’ sovereignty:  their fiscal autonomy and 
their political status in the new United States.  If the Constitution authorized 
the Court’s jurisdiction and the Court were to issue a judgment adverse to a 
state, then payment would draw money out of the state’s treasury, which only 
its legislature had the power to spend.177  And the very idea that the Court 
could make a state answer before it on the plea of a foreign litigant was not 
only an insult, but it was also not something the states had necessarily agreed 
to when they accepted the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases 
“in which a State shall be party.”178 
Vanstophorst involved loans to Maryland by two Dutch brothers, Jacob 
and Nicolaas van Staphorst, who were money lenders in Amsterdam.179  In 
March 1781, the Maryland legislature had appointed Matthew Ridley, a 
British-born Baltimore merchant, to go to Europe to secure war loans.  Six 
months later, Ridley arrived in France where he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining a sovereign-to-sovereign loan.  In May 1782, Ridley went to 
Holland and, two months later, came to an agreement with the van Staphorsts 
for a line of credit for Maryland with repayment to be made by annual 
shipments of a large, fixed amount of tobacco crop.  The terms Ridley 
negotiated were disastrous for Maryland:  the contracts pegged tobacco at a 
very low price and gave the van Staphorsts the option of buying any surplus 
tobacco left over after repayment at the same low price. 
Maryland tried for several years to renegotiate the improvident bargain to 
no avail.  The van Staphorsts, acting through an American agent, ultimately 
sought leave to file suit against Maryland in the Supreme Court in the 
February 1791 term, with the case docketed on March 3, 1791.  For Chief 
Justice John Jay, it was the second time that he was asked to decide the 
controversy:  he had been one of four arbitrators appointed by the parties to 
try to resolve the dispute in 1786.180  The arbitration had been aborted when 
the Maryland legislature voted to negotiate a settlement in 1787. 
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Arbitration had been a common method of dispute resolution in England 
among merchants and tradespeople, but it had been overshadowed in 
England by the late eighteenth century on account of the primacy of the jury 
and the common-law courts.  It continued, however, as an important dispute 
resolution mechanism among merchants engaged in foreign maritime trade 
and commerce.  A modern marker of this reality is that when Congress 
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act,181 it did so under the admiralty and 
maritime powers that had been inferred from Article III’s grant of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction to the national courts. 
The plea of Supreme Court original jurisdiction in Vanstophorst appeared 
to have a sound constitutional textual basis.  Article III extended the national 
judicial power to “Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign . . . 
Citizens” and also provided that “the supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction” in cases “in which a State shall be Party.”182  Luther Martin, 
Maryland’s very able attorney general and an ardent anti-Federalist during 
the Constitutional Convention,183 did not initially file a reply on the state’s 
behalf but later complied with the Court’s order to plead or face default 
judgment.184  Since the key witnesses were in Holland, plaintiffs’ counsel, 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, acting in a private capacity, moved the 
Court to appoint commissioners to conduct depositions there, pursuant to 
section 30 of the Judiciary Act.185  Although a docket entry indicates that 
these depositions were taken, the parties ended up settling and the case was 
dismissed on August 6, 1792.186 
What is most striking about Vanstophorst are the international and 
thoroughly modern features of the controversy.  The problem of enforcing 
sovereign debt persists today on the international plane, as does the challenge 
of designing a viable forum for dispute resolution of sovereign debt cases.187  
The potential use of the Supreme Court was an ingenious attempt at a 
solution:  the Court—as an intermediate institution between foreign bankers 
and individual state legislatures (a “quasi-international tribunal”)—promised 
a “credibly neutral tribunal.”188  Accordingly, the question of whether Article 
III of the Constitution contemplated such a tribunal was a difficult one.  Legal 
scholarship on these early constitutional cases usually emphasizes the 
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sovereign immunity doctrinal features, which tend to obscure the thoroughly 
modern larger policy implications and functional design motivations. 
As Vanstophorst was winding down, a far more famous suit that was not 
settled—Chisholm v. Georgia189—was making its way through the national 
courts.  Chisholm, too, involved state sovereign debt to an out-of-state 
creditor.  However, it did not implicate the more sensitive, structural problem 
of foreign bankers with lines of credit extended to multiple states but rather, 
a onetime past contract to an out-of-state American creditor.  As such, 
Chisholm accentuated the symbolic aspect of the state sovereign debt cases 
and de-emphasized their systemic international political economy 
ramifications.  Both cases illustrate the importance of commercial cases in 
the early years of the Supreme Court, a fact that we often forget today when 
we are accustomed to the Court as a public law institution and as a 
constitutional court, not as a court of international and interstate commerce. 
II.  ENLARGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Part I sketched the basic contours of the original constitutional plan for the 
newly created Supreme Court and federal court system based on the Articles 
of Confederation, the Constitutional Convention, the language of Article III, 
and the Judiciary Act and Process Act, both passed by the First Congress in 
1789.  It also examined the first case docketed at the Supreme Court, an 
international state sovereign debt controversy.  Part II applies that account of 
the original constitutional plan for the federal courts to point out some ways 
in which present-day conventional wisdom about the federal courts diverges 
from the 1787–1792 plan. 
A.  Federal Courts Should Stay out of Foreign Affairs and Defer to the 
Political Branches 
We do not need to spend too much time on rebutting this conventional 
wisdom:  even a quick scan of Article III reveals the extent to which foreign 
affairs were a focus of federal judicial power.190  The most important was the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  The seas were the primary arena of 
interaction between U.S. and foreign sovereign and private interests.  Given 
the importance of transatlantic commerce and trade to the fledgling United 
States, maritime and admiralty jurisdiction was important in peacetime, thus 
the need to provide a credible forum for dispute resolution of shipping 
disputes.  And it was also important in war, when disrupting this trade was 
an essential part of any armed conflict involving the European powers. 
Congress did have constitutional power, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 
11, to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” and it did pass 
statutes authorizing captures191 and regarding distribution of prize proceeds 
 
 189. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 190. See FLAHERTY, supra note 9, at 1–45; Lee, supra note 118, at 1730–36. 
 191. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170–71 (1804) (interpreting an act 
of Congress that authorized the capture of any U.S. owned or chartered vessel bound for 
French ports or under the employment of persons subject to French jurisdiction). 
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to captains, officers, and crews.  But Congress did not usually go into the 
nuts and bolts of setting out the rules of maritime capture—e.g., when to 
declare a blockade, the conditions under which captures were valid, how to 
determine belligerent or neutral status, what private Americans could or 
could not do to maintain neutrality, what was contraband that could be seized 
off a neutral vessel in time of war, or what was condemnable cargo even if 
not contraband under the doctrine of contamination.192  Such important and 
fact-dependent issues were left to the federal courts to decide.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in The Paquete Habana193 shows that this default foreign 
policy role of federal judges was still well understood at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
Another example of the capacious foreign affairs jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in the original constitutional plan is the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction.  Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls.”194  “Affecting” is a very expansive word.  As it turned out, there 
were not many cases involving ambassadors filed in the Supreme Court, but 
the lack of such cases was certainly not by design.  The other prong of the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is as to cases “in which a State may be 
Party.”  That included not just state-on-state controversies, which are 
functionally like international disputes among the states but also potential 
suits brought by foreign states against states for systemic treaty violations, 
such as of the 1783 Treaty of Peace.195 
B.  Appellate Jurisdiction Is the Supreme Court’s “Essential Role” 
Today, the Supreme Court is viewed primarily as a constitutional appellate 
court in both expert and popular opinion, but the plain language of Article III 
suggests another essential role:  the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
over foreign ambassadorial cases and interstate or international controversies 
involving states.  In the present day, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
is only rarely exercised and almost exclusively in state-as-party cases, but 
that was not the original constitutional plan, an intuition borne out by Article 
IX of the Articles of Confederation, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and the Court’s early cases, the first of which was Vanstophorst. 
It is important to emphasize that judicial review—the “judicial duty to say 
what the law is” as a matter of federal treaty, statute, or the Constitution— 
can and does arise in the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction, too, and 
not only by the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Furthermore, original 
 
 192. The equivalent on land would be for federal judges to decide all legal questions 
regarding the conduct of sieges or captures of prisoners or confiscation or destruction of roads, 
food, bridges, and crops as enemy property during land warfare.  Of course, granting federal 
judicial power to decide such matters was not a part of the original constitutional plan, which 
was based on anticipated international conflicts at sea where there would be less need to 
account for overlapping and dominant state judicial power.  
 193. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 194. U.S CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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jurisdiction entails power to decide the entire case or controversy that 
appellate jurisdiction limited to issues that “arise under” federal law does not, 
although any adjudication of state law would not be binding on state courts.  
For example, one way to think about Marbury is as a failed attempt by the 
petitioner for a writ of mandamus against U.S. Secretary of State James 
Madison to assert that the Court could entertain his petition because his 
“Case” was one “affecting” a “public Minister,” namely, Madison.  Of 
course, the Court implicitly and correctly presumed that the original 
jurisdiction clause applied only to “all Cases affecting” foreign 
“Ambassadors, other public Ministers, or Consuls,” not American ministers, 
because the clause was about minimizing foreign friction, not about 
preventing executive branch officials from violating the legal rights of 
Americans.  It was possible for an American to sue a state, including for a 
claim under a constitutional provision such as the Contract Clause, under a 
plain reading of Article III and section 13 of the First Judiciary Act as the 
Court in Chisholm held.  However, this possibility was foreclosed by the 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.196  But as the recent motion for 
leave to file in the Court in Texas v. Pennsylvania197 demonstrates, judicial 
review of important issues by states suing to invoke the Court’s original 
jurisdiction (e.g., for unconstitutional selection of presidential electors by 
another state) is a surging phenomenon.198  Whatever the merits of Texas’s 
specific motion, which was dismissed for lack of standing, the Court’s 
original jurisdiction is a viable forum for airing important constitutional 
issues with an impeccable originalist pedigree.  This is particularly true given 
the potential for conducting independent constitutional fact-finding before 
the Court, perhaps even by jury, as section 13 of the First Judiciary Act 
authorized.  This intriguing way to think about constitutional adjudication at 
the Supreme Court may seem fanciful, but it is consistent with the original 
constitutional plan for the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was seen as critical to ensure 
the supremacy and uniformity of federal law, as Henry Hart famously 
argued,199 but when the Constitution was framed and ratified, there were also 
significant concerns about that jurisdiction that extended “both as to Law and 
Fact,” based on the experience with the national court of appeals under the 
Articles.  At the time (before drafting and passage of the Bill of Rights), there 
was no guarantee that the Court could not conduct a new jury retrial under 
Article III to nullify the state proceedings.  Edmund Pendleton, who backed 
the Constitution at Virginia’s ratifying convention and was its first chief 
 
 196. The Eleventh Amendment states:  “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 197. No. 155, Orig., 2020 WL 7296814 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020) (mem.) (denying leave to file 
a bill of complaint for lack of standing). 
 198. See Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Texas, 2020 WL 7296814 (No. 155, 
Orig.). 
 199. See generally Hart, supra note 15. 
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justice, spoke for the view of many regarding Article III:  “I object to the 
appellate jurisdiction as the greatest evil in it.”200  Consequently, he and other 
moderate Federalists believed that salvation lay in a robust power for 
Congress to make regulations and exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction.201   
C.  The Importance of “All Cases Arising Under” Federal Law 
As described in Part I.D, there was no constitutional arising under 
jurisdiction implemented in the Judiciary Act of 1789 except for crimes, 
seizures under federal revenue and customs laws, and the ATS.202  Indeed, 
although specialized arising under statutes like the ATS were occasionally 
enacted in the nineteenth century to protect important federal interests, a 
lasting general federal-question jurisdiction statute was not enacted until 
1875 after the Civil War.203  By contrast, controversies between states were 
not only an important part of the Court’s original jurisdiction in the Judiciary 
Act, interstate controversies were also a key subject matter of the Articles of 
Confederation system.204  And yet there is no “all” before “Controversies 
between two or more States” in Article III.   
The upshot is that Justice Joseph Story’s presumption that “all” before 
“Cases” is significant and requires mandatory jurisdiction not 
constitutionally required for “Controversies”205 does not fit the words of the 
Constitution or the original constitutional plan.  The key primary sources do 
not confirm the modern intuition that “arising under” jurisdiction must be 
vested in federal courts.  Again, a large part of the perceived essentiality of 
Article III federal-question jurisdiction is that it includes jurisdiction of cases 
“arising under” the Constitution and therefore provides a textual basis for the 
Court’s power of judicial review for constitutionality.  But judicial review 
could and was exercised under other heads of Article III jurisdiction. 
D.  Original and Appellate Jurisdiction Are Qualitatively Different 
If the idea of “appellate jurisdiction” was an outgrowth of the national 
court of appeals from the Articles of Confederation, which is the sense we 
 
 200. 9 DHRC, supra note 72, at 1101 (June 10, 1788).  
 201. See 10 id. at 1399–1400 (June 19, 1788) (reporting Pendleton’s assertions that 
Congress’s power to make regulations and exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction was the 
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 202. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24; see also Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into 
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Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1147 n.14 (1999). 
 203. See Removal of Causes Act, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (“That the circuit 
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 204. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 176, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he 
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get from the Virginia Plan and the Convention materials, then “Appellate 
Jurisdiction” as the words are used in Article III means a full-blown 
reexamination of facts and law.  “Appellate” jurisdiction essentially means 
“retrial,” no matter how brief or protracted the proceedings were in the court 
of original jurisdiction.206  Hence, section 12 removal jurisdiction in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was viewed as an instance of appellate jurisdiction, 
even when a suit was merely filed without any proceedings in state court.  On 
the opposite end, a suit already tried to jury verdict in state court could be 
removed to federal court and there retried by federal judges and still be 
viewed as a species of appellate jurisdiction.  This latter possibility validated 
the concerns about federal appellate jurisdiction raised in the state ratifying 
conventions, which ultimately resulted in the Re-examination Clause of the 
Seventh Amendment to close off posttrial removals to nullify civil jury 
verdicts.  The self-constraint mechanism that the First Congress imposed 
despite this potential constitutional breadth of appellate jurisdiction was the 
“writ of error” (versus “appeal” as typical in admiralty and maritime suits) in 
section 22 (circuit courts) and section 25 (state courts) of the Judiciary Act.207 
The presumption among modern federal courts scholars that original and 
appellate jurisdiction are entirely different has caused confusion about the 
nature of the early federal court system, such as the belief that appellate 
jurisdiction is necessary for the Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional 
duty to declare federal law.  Indeed, original jurisdiction is in theory a more 
effective means of judicial review because it gives the Court power to decide 
the entire case or controversy, not just the federal questions and hence cannot 
be blocked by pretextual state law grounds, although the Court’s view of state 
law would not be binding on state courts.  Additionally, if Article III 
“appellate Jurisdiction” differed from “original Jurisdiction” only in that the 
case “originated” in another court before reaching the “appellate” court—
then it reinforces the need for Congress’s power to make “Exceptions” and 
“Regulations” to it, as the First Congress did so robustly.  Moreover, 
understanding the equivalence helps us to perceive how federal court 
exclusive original jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction were 
viewed as functional substitutes, and so the First Congress’s creation of the 
former mitigated the imperative for the latter.  Finally, grasping that there is 
very little conceptual difference between original and appellate jurisdiction 
makes it hard to accept, at least as an originalist matter, the “appellate 
review” model that Article III review of legal questions and deference as to 
fact-finding satisfies any Article III concerns about Congress conferring 
judicial power to non–Article III tribunals. 
E.  Reliance on State Law and Common Law for Substance and Procedure 
The Rules of Decision Act and the First Process Act show that the First 
Congress endeavored to limit reliance on state law and common law, 
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applying state law in common-law causes of action only, but not equity 
causes or admiralty and maritime suits, both in terms of substantive rules of 
decision and procedural rules.  Section 16 of the Judiciary Act made clear 
that equity was a last resort, unavailable “in any case where [a] plain, 
adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”208  But of course there 
were many admiralty and maritime suits in the late eighteenth century, and 
equity was also an important and growing aspect of the early federal courts’ 
business (e.g., deciding title to land based on conflicting state grants and 
claims), growing to the point that today equity almost seems the norm, not 
the exception.  The fact that the First Process Act required courts to apply 
“the forms and modes of proceedings . . . according to the course of the civil 
law,”209 however short-lived, is a telling confirmation of the extent to which 
the founders were willing to experiment with foreign rule-of-law modes, 
move away from the English common-law example, and provide a hospitable 
forum for continental European merchants, creditors, and litigants. 
F.  Federal Courts and State Sovereignty 
The conventional wisdom is that an important function of the Supreme 
Court and the federal courts is to protect state sovereignty and the 
constitutional commitment to federalism.  That view was strongly voiced in 
Justice James Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm (which was abrogated by the 
Eleventh Amendment), underpinned Chief Justice Roger Taney’s infamous 
majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,210 later returned in post-
Reconstruction Supreme Court precedents, and underwent a modern 
resurgence in Rehnquist Court anti-commandeering and state sovereign 
immunity decisions.211 
But the Chisholm majority may have been correct in interpreting the 
original Article III as permitting it to decide a suit brought by a South 
Carolinian against Georgia based on contracts the state had allegedly 
breached, as Justice John Marshall Harlan surmised in his concurrence in 
Hans v. Louisiana.212  Certainly, offering the Supreme Court up as a credibly 
neutral forum for the resolution of state sovereign debt cases is a plausible 
reading of the original meaning of Article III and consistent with the general 
original orientation of setting up the national judiciary to solve “state as 
party” controversies, including commercial and contract debt cases.  Recall, 
on this point, that the first case on the Supreme Court’s docket was 
Vanstophorst and that Maryland’s attorney general, Luther Martin, a noted 
anti-Federalist, did not object to the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
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I do not mean to overdo this point, and it bears remembering that the First 
Congress was parsimonious in dispensing Article III judicial power precisely 
because it sought to limit encroachment by the new federal courts on 
preexisting state judicial power, juries, and the business of the state courts.  
The federal judicial power was deployed very sparingly and exclusively only 
as to federal crimes, admiralty and maritime cases, and matters of revenue, 
forfeiture, and penalty under U.S. impost and trade laws.  But I think it is 
equally clear that within those exclusive enclaves (with the important 
exception of the saving-to-suitors exception to admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction), during the critical early years and especially from 1789 to 1792, 
state rules of decision and procedures were displaced in favor of the law of 
nations and civil law.  In other words, there was a clear and strong desire to 
depart from state and English precedents in these subject matters of greatest 
interest for foreign merchants, creditors, and public litigants.  The aim was 
to entice foreigners to bring their grievances in the new federal courts rather 
than to face inhospitable state courts or to lobby foreign sovereigns to resort 
to political measures including war, which would have been disastrous for 
the demilitarized United States from 1787 to 1792. 
G.  The Supreme Court Is Predominantly a Public Law Institution 
The early Supreme Court did hear many important public law cases that 
are famous today, but it was also designed to hear international commercial 
cases like Vanstophorst, the first case docketed at the Court in 1791.  
Certainly, commercial and public maritime cases featured prominently on the 
dockets of the lower federal courts in the late eighteenth century and well 
into the early nineteenth century.213  Diversity jurisdiction in the late 
eighteenth century was functionally similar to international commercial 
arbitration today—a credibly neutral form of dispute resolution available to 
foreigners and out-of-state parties to encourage cross-border loans, business 
deals, shipping, trade, and investment.  Both experts and the public today 
perceive the Supreme Court as a constitutional and appellate court.  But the 
original plan for it included much more: an international commercial court, 
a diplomatic court, an interstate umpire, and to borrow Edmund Randolph’s 
words from the Virginia Plan that launched the Constitutional Convention, a 
trial court of “dèrnier resort.”214 
CONCLUSION 
My aim in this Article has been to use primary sources to draw an accurate 
picture of what the adopters of the Constitution’s judiciary article and the 
First Congress which implemented it were doing from 1787 to 1792, the 
critical years in which the Constitution was adopted and the federal courts 
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established.  I do not claim to have uncovered any new source that the great 
scholars of the early federal courts—Warren, Goebel, and Ritz—did not 
previously locate and describe to some degree.  But attempting to reconstruct 
history is a kaleidoscope.  Every lawyer-scholar looks for different things 
and notices different things at different times in history.  In the early and 
mid–twentieth century, when Warren and Goebel labored in these vineyards, 
they sought to curtail federal judicial lawmaking vis-à-vis Congress and 
reinforce the primacy of state regulation of Americans’ primary conduct and 
interactions, notwithstanding the onset of the modern administrative state.  
The pro-foreigner orientation, the robust specification of the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, the pinpoint nature of the lower federal courts’ 
exclusive original arising under jurisdiction, and the severe regulation of the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction were not prominent concerns given those 
eminent scholars’ perspectives. 
What is the picture that emerges of the original constitutional plan for the 
federal courts from 1787 to 1792?  There was a strong consensus that the new 
courts should not encroach on the state courts beyond what important 
national interests required.  Consequently, and for reasons of cost, the federal 
courts were designed to have a small footprint that focused on the oceans, the 
principal paths of international and interstate trade and commerce.  (Justice 
Story would conquer the seas and move the pro-commerce campaign 
landward in the nineteenth century.)  There is very little sense that the new 
national courts were to play a leading role in domestic governance or in 
protecting the rights of Americans.  In fact, there was a distinct, hardwired 
favoritism for foreign litigants, especially foreign diplomats.  And the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction (including jury trials and an unlimited 
power of judicial review over the entire case or controversy) was an essential 
feature of this federal judicial system as originally planned. 
What this all means for constitutional jurisprudence and federal judiciary 
reform today is a separate question.  It is noteworthy that originalism as a 
mode of constitutional interpretation is ascendant both on the Supreme Court 
and in the academy.  An accurate picture of the original constitutional plan 
accordingly seems more important than ever.  Additionally, there are 
increasing calls for reforming the Supreme Court and the federal judicial 
system.  A better understanding of the original constitutional plan can inform 
our sense of the art of the possible in terms of federal court reform and foster 
an appreciation for the complexity of the problem.  But at the end of the day, 
my primary aim has been to draw a more accurate picture of the original 
constitutional plan, without an eye for modern implications.  In that respect, 
I have been surprised and learned greatly from trying to reconstruct the past. 
